By Adv. Aditya Ashtekar, Associate at Lex Credence
October 15 2026
I. Introduction
In essence, an anti-arbitration injunction (or “AAI”) is an order prohibiting the start or continuation of arbitration that is granted against a party and/or an arbitral tribunal. In short, AAIs are orders issued by a court to prevent a party from arbitrating a dispute or carrying out the arbitral process. AAIs have historically been employed as a delaying and obstructionist strategy, increasing the likelihood of court involvement by depriving the tribunal of the authority to decide its jurisdiction. AAI usage has also been discouraged by other countries, which only permit this remedy in extreme situations where the arbitration process would be oppressive, vexatious, and unethical. The illegality of the arbitration agreement and the non-arbitrability of the subject matter are only two of the many additional reasons why Indian courts issue such remedies.
For arbitration policy, the emergence of AAIs thus poses a conceptual dilemma. AAIs, on the one hand, are incompatible with the legislative goal of minimizing judicial intrusion and the fundamental idea of “kompetenz-kompetenz.”5 Many nations, however, see tribunal authority as non-exclusive, allowing the courts to step in in specific circumstances.6 Court intervention in arbitration processes through possibly obstructionist remedies is at the heart of the AAIs problem.7 Because there is no official rule in this area and no specific judgement of the court allowing the granting of AAIs, the issue is still controversial in the
- Sharad Bansal and Divyanshu Agarwal, ‘Are Anti-Arbitration Injunctions A Malaise? An Analysis in the Context of Indian Law’ (2015) 31(4) Arbitration International 613; Hakeem Seriki, Injunctive Relief and International Arbitration (Informa Law from Routledge 2015); Jennifer L Gorskie, ‘US Courts and the Anti-Arbitration Injunction’ (2012) 28(2) Arbitration International 295.
- Excalibur Ventures LLC v Texas Keystone Inc [2011] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 289
- Sairam Subramanian, ‘Anti-arbitration injunctions and their compatibility with the New York convention and the Indian law of arbitration: future directions for Indian law and policy’ (2018) 34(2) Arbitration International 185.
- Chatterjee Petrochem Co v Haldia Petrochemicals Ltd (2014) 14 SCC 574
- Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Reflections on the Use of Anti-Suit Injunction in International Arbitration’ in Loukas Mistelis and Julian Lew (ed), Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2006) 203–15.
- Hakeem Seriki, ‘Anti-Arbitration Injunctions and the English Courts: Judicial Intervention or Judicial Protection’ (2013) 16(2) International Arbitration Law Review 43.
- North London Railway Co v Great Northern Railway Co [1883] 11 QBD 30.
Indian context. This article therefore examines the legal and economic consequences of antiarbitration injunctions and considers the type of judicial approach required towards such injunctions that can contribute to India’s evolution as an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction.
II. Judicial Precedents
The Calcutta High Court, in the case of The Board of Trustees of Port of Kolkata v. Louis Dreyfus Armatures SAS has recognised the courts to grant Anti-Arbitration Injunction on the following grounds-
- Where an issue is raised as to whether there is any valid arbitration agreement between the parties and the court finds that no agreement exists.
- Where continuation of foreign arbitration proceedings might be oppressive or vexatious or unconscionable.
- Where the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.
In the case of World Sport Group (Mauritius) Ltd v. MSM Satellite (Singapore) Pte Ltd, the Supreme Court denied AAI, stating that the applicant did not meet the requirements outlined in Section 45.9 Nonetheless, it noted that in situations when the arbitration agreement is invalid, inoperative, or unfeasible, civil courts still have the authority to award AAIs.
III. Common Law Jurisprudence Surrounding AAIs
When granting an AAI, the courts have taken a guarded stance under common law. With continuing arbitration procedures, the courts’ non-interventionist stance is consistent with the language of the domestic arbitration acts.10 For example, judicial involvement is expressly prohibited by the English Arbitration Act, unless circumstances specifically specified by the Act itself exist.11 Three specific situations highlight the narrow scope of court intervention: first, when the arbitration agreement is “invalid, inoperative, or incapable of being performed”; Secondly, a challenge to an award made under the English Arbitration Act on
- The Board of Trustees of Port of Kolkata V. Louis Dreyfus Armatures SAS, (2014) SCC Online Cal 17695.
- World Sport Group (Mauritius) Ltd V. MSM Satellite (Singapore) Pvt Ltd, (2014) 11 SCC 639.
- Hakeem Seriki, ‘Anti-Arbitration Injunctions and the English Courts: Judicial Intervention or Judicial Protection’ (2013) 16(2) International Arbitration Law Review 43.
- The Arbitration Act 1996, s1 (c) (United Kingdom).
specific grounds; Lastly, when a party who is purported to be a party but did not participate in the proceedings requests redress.
Additionally, Hong Kong courts have often favoured arbitration processes over AAIs in concurrent actions before them. In doing so, the courts have recognized that they are still able to issue anti-arbitration injunctions despite Article 5 of the Model clause. Nonetheless, the court has ruled that the authority must be used “sparingly” and in “exceptional circumstances,” much like the English authorities. Furthermore, when the arbitral tribunal has rejected a challenge to its jurisdictions, AAIs should not be granted.
A thorough analysis of the aforementioned authorities leads to the conclusion that common law courts have generally upheld the least-interventionist stance with regard to ongoing arbitration proceedings, and they have done so for both domestic and international arbitration.
A comprehensive analysis of every case mentioned above demonstrates the pro-arbitration posture taken by the majority of common law precedents. With few exceptions, the courts have historically been hesitant to award AAIs because of the fundamentals of their arbitration regimes and international obligations, which all support the courts’ minimal involvement in a case that is the subject of arbitration procedures. As a result, courts have only granted AAIs in extraordinary situations, such as when there has been a previous court decision declaring the arbitration agreement or clause to be void or non-existent, when the proceedings have continued in a way that is oppressive or vexatious, or when the parties have waived their right to arbitrate through their mutual consent or actions.
IV. Indian Jurisprudence in regards to Anti-Arbitration Injunctions
In Kvaerner Cementation India Ltd. v. Bajranglal Agarwal & Anr. the Supreme Court refused to issue an AAI on the grounds that the tribunal had the authority to determine its own jurisdictional competence. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has adopted opposing stances in later rulings. The Court determined that an arbitral tribunal does not have complete authority to choose its own jurisdiction in SBP & Co v. Patel Engineering Limited. According to
- SA v KB [2011] HKCFI 2029 (Hong Kong Court of First Instance)
- Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (3rdedn, Kluwer Law International 2021) 1349-422.
- Lin Ming v Chen Shu Quan [2012] HKFCI 328 (Hong Kong Court of First Instance).
- Kvaerner Cementation India Ltd V. Bajranglal Agarwal & Anr. (2012) 5 SCC 214.
- SBP & Co. V. Patel Engineering Ltd, (2005) 8 SCC 618.
Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, civil courts still have the authority to issue injunctions.
It should be noted that the power to provide interim relief for an arbitration has been granted to the court under Section 9 and the tribunal under Section 17 of the Act. This authority includes the ability to issue temporary injunctions. Although the arbitral tribunal has the authority to provide such remedies in relation to the conflicts’ subject matter, the court’s authority is not necessarily restricted to that area.
In the past, courts have determined that an injunction sought is an equitable remedy that takes the form of a court order and, in accordance with Section 151 of the CPC, requires a party to do or refrain from doing specific actions, thus not restricting them to the dispute’s subject matter. The Act also serves as a self-contained law for the issuance of injunctive relief, offering sufficient corrective actions to the party who has been wronged by the issuance or denial of such an injunction. As a result, using the courts under the CPC is mostly preventable and superfluous.
One theme that runs through most of these decisions is the courts’ authority to grant AAIs when the arbitration agreement is declared illegal or defective, or when the matter cannot be arbitrated. However, these circumstances must be taken into account throughout the pre- and post-commencement stages of the arbitration.19 The rule that civil courts should not, with very few exceptions, interfere with the tribunal’s jurisdiction and utilize their power to make temporary orders under Section 9 of the Act once the arbitration process has started is now a well-established legal norm. According to Section 17 of the Act, the tribunal retains the only right to provide such temporary relief. In this case, granting AAIs in the post-commencement stage not only directly contradicts the Act’s plan but also raises concerns regarding the effectiveness of AAI.
- Sharad Bansal and Divyanshu Agarwal, ‘Are Anti-Arbitration Injunctions A Malaise? An Analysis in the Context of Indian Law’ (2015) 31(4) Arbitration International 613; Hakeem Seriki, Injunctive Relief and International Arbitration (Informa Law from Routledge 2015); Jennifer L Gorskie, ‘US Courts and the AntiArbitration Injunction’ (2012) 28(2) Arbitration International 295.
- Ibid.
- Arcelormittal Nippon Steel (India) Ltd v Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd (2022) 1 SCC 712.
V. Way Forward
Although this article illustrates certain situations in which the granting of AAIs may be justified, the more important question is whether the remedy in the form of an AAI can only be awarded by courts. Regardless of the arbitration’s location, the parties frequently petition the courts for an injunction under the CPC against the proceedings based on the justifications listed in the aforementioned article. This is the case even if the arbitral procedures were conducted without reference to the Indian Evidence Act or the CPC.
However, Indian courts appear to agree on one point: the civil court’s power to grant injunctions in anti-arbitration cases must be used cautiously. This much-needed relief from Indian courts has shifted the balance in favour of arbitration. It is widely held that India’s legal system has to take a pro-arbitration stance because of the vast number of cases that get up in the country’s civil and commercial courts. The aim of the Act may be undermined by the long-term resolution of these anti-arbitration cases. Restricting the scope of review for civil court involvement in anti-arbitration injunction proceedings might significantly address this issue and dilemma.
Using this option of adopting a limited approach to the injunction-granting authority has a number of advantages. This entails maintaining the arbitral process’s integrity, honouring the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction, providing a timely and efficient remedy without undue delay, and most importantly, avoidance of unwarranted judicial intervention, which was a major factor in the parties’ decision to use arbitration as their preferred method of resolving disputes.